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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH-IDAHO SCHOOL SUPPLY
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
UTAH: STATE
BU IL DING
BOARD and HERBERT F'. SlVIART,
Director of :F'inance of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent,

Case No.
11395

DESK l\i!ANUF1-\CTURING COMPANY,
Intervenor and Appellant.

A~1ERICAN

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought for declaratory judgment interpreting, construing and declaring the validity
of certain statute or statutes of the State of Utah, in
which action appellant intervened on the side of the
defendants.
l

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Declaratory judgment was granted in the lower
Court, which judgment concluded, in part, that the
Utah State Building Board was not obliged to let the
contract in question to the lowest bidder who in their
judgment was responsible and qualified to do the work
and which directed said board to enter into a contract
with plaintiff, who was the high bidder. From this
judgment, intervenor appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the decision of the lower
Court reversed and plaintiff's action dismissed with
prejudice.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State of Utah, by and through its Department
of Finance, advertised for sealed, written bids for permanent seating to be furnished and installed in the
"Special Events Arena" at the University of Utah,
payment for which was to be made from trust funds
collected as part of student fees and held in trust by
a depository of the State.
Advertisement for bids was pursuant to detailed
plans and specifications prepared by professional architects commissioned by the State and approved by both
the University of Utah and the State prior to their

being published. These detailed plans and specifications
expressly called for bids on three different types of
seating manufactured by American Seating Company,
of which plaintiff is the local sales representative, and
for one type of seating manufactured by intervenor.
The four types of seating were identified by the two
manufacturers' model numbers and by detailed characteristics supplied by the two manufacturers relating
to the various types of seating. In each instance, the
detailed specifications required that the seating have
a self-rising feature which would cause the seats to rise
to an upright position automatically when unoccupied.
Intervenor submitted a bid in strict conformity
to the plans and specifications in the sum of $296,049.18
or a unit price of $19.94 per seat. Plaintiff submitted
a bid for what was designated in the detailed specifications as "Seat Type I'' of $347,568.00 or a unit
price of $23.41; for "Seat Type 2" of $391,366.00 or
a unit price of $26.36; and for "Seat Type 3" of $335,542.00 or a unit price of $22.60. In addition, plaintiff
proposed deductive alternates on "Seat Type 3" of
$7,571.00 or $0.51 per unit for leaving off the plastic
arm rests and of $25,982.00 or $1.75 per unit for omitting the required self-riser.
The Board of the University Regents, after
some dickering with plaintiff, recommended to the
building board acceptance of plaintiff's bid for "Seat
Type 4" with the self-riser omitted or a total of $309,559.95 and preservation of an "option" given by plain-
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tiff after opening of the bids to later add an improved
self-riser which plaintiff was attempting to develop.
This recommendation later was amended to include
elimination of plastic armrests, bringing the total bid
of plaintiff which the Regents recommended accepting
to $301,987.98.
Both plaintiff and intervenor accompanied their
bids with bonds and met all of the other statutory requirements to have their bids considered. However,
neither intervenor nor any other bidder was permitted
to submit a competing bid or "option" which included
elimination of either the self-riser or the plastic arm
rests.
The building board approved the recommendatiO'ii
of the Regents. However, on advice of the Attorney
General of the State of Utah the Board declined to let
the contract to plaintiff and prepared and submitted
to intervenor contracts for furnishing and installing the
seating. Intervenor signed the contracts and returned
them to the State of Utah, accompanied by the necessary bonds.
These documents were in the hands of representatives of the State of Utah and the contracts were
on the desk of the director of the State building board
awaiting his signature when he was prohibited from
signing them by a writ issued by this Honorable Court
in a separate proceeding. His signature, at that time,
was all that was needed to provide a legally-binding
contract between intervenor and the State of Utah.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING STATUTES OF THE STATE OF
UTAH RELATING TO CONTRACTS LET BY
THE BUILDING BOARD FOR FACILITIES
FINANCED BY STUDENT FUNDS.
We are principally concerned with two statutes
of the State of Utah, the first of which merits setting
forth totally and the second of which merits excerpting.
53-38-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended

provides:
"Deposits of bond proceeds-Powers of Utah
state building board-Powers of state department of finance. - That the proceeds derived
from the sale of any bonds authorized under the
provisions hereof shall be deposited by the treasurer of the board in a bank or trust company
approved as a regular depository by the state
depository board to the credit of the board and
kept in a separate fund and used solely for the
purpose for which the bonds are authorized as
provided by resolution of the board. The Utah
state building board is authorized to make all
contracts and execute all instruments which in
its discretion may be deemed necessary or advisable to provide for the acquisition, purchase,
construction, improvement, remodeling, addition
to, extension, furnishing, and equipment of the
building and the acquisition of all necessary land
therefor, and the state department of finance is
directed and authorized to issue warrants upon
the state treasurer against such funds for such
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amounts as he may from time to time find to be
due upon audited itemized estimates and claims
presented by the Utah state building board as
provided under the provisions of the resolution
of the board of regents, state board of education
or board of trustees authorizing the issuance of
the bonds and which bear the approval of the
official or officials designated for _such purpose
by resolution of the board authorizing such
bonds."
63-10-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,

provides in material part:
"Power and duties.-The Utah state building
board shall carry out the building and expansion
program of the state as provided by law, as and
when funds are from time to time available. The
board is given power and authority to do any
and aU things which in its judgment may be
necessary or proper for carrying out the provisions of this chapter including, but not limited
to, the following express powers and duties: ...
. . . " ( 5) To cause to be prepared and sub-

mitted, either by its own employees or others,
designs, plans and specifications for the various
buildings and improvements, or other work to
be carried out by the board; ... provided, that
no building shall be constructed, improvements
made or work done for, or on the property of,
any state institution until the locations, design,
plans and specifications therefor shall be approved by the board, commission or officials
charged with the administration of the affairs of
such institution. . . .
. . . " ( 7) To make contracts for any work
which the board is autho:i;ized by law to do or
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cause to be done; . . . and, provided that any
contract except those for professional services
to be let to the lowest bidder who in the judgment of the board is responsible and qualified to
do the work. The judgment of the board as to
the responsibility and qualifications of such bidders shall be conclusive, except in case of fraud
or bad faith. . . ."
A brief, albeit thorough, consolidation of these two
statutes should resolve the question as to whether the
lower Court erred and should resolve that question in
favor of the appellant.
Chapter 38 of Title 53 deals, generally, with campus
buildings financed from the issuance of bonds as was
the instant structure (Exhibit P2). Section 3, set forth
hereinabove, after disposing of the manner in which
the proceeds should be preserved, states: " . . . The
Utah state building board is authorized to make ~11
contracts and execute all instruments which in its discretion may be deemed necessary or advisable to provide
for the acquisition, purchase, construction, improvement,
remodeling, addition to, extension, furnishing and equipment of the building . . . ".
That the building board deemed it "necessary or
advisable" to make the instant contract cannot be left
in doubt. The board published and circulated the detailed plans and specifications (Exhibit Pl) which
included a sample contract; it invited bids from both
plaintiff and intervenor; and, it subsequently prepared
and submitted for the signature of intervenor contracts
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identical to the sample contract which was made a part
of the detailed plans and specifications.
The authority of the board to make such contracts
is made exclusive by 53-38-5 UCA 1953, as amended.
Such authority is not granted concurrent to any such
authority vested in or reserved to the Board of Regents
or any other public body.
This exclusive authority having been unequivocally
established, reference must be made to the provisions
of 63-10-7 UCA 1953, as amended, to inquire as to
the manner in which such contract must be let.
Subsection ( 5) authorizes the board to "cause to
be prepared . . . design_s, plans and specifications for
the various buildings and improvements . . . ". This
it did (Exhibit Pl) . This same subsection reserves to
the Board of Regents, in the instant case, the approval
of " ... the locations, design, plans and specifications
therefor ... ". This approval was made of the plans
and specifications PRIOR TO THE ADVERTISING FOR BIDS.
The Board of Regents having given its approval,
its authority had expired prior to the opening of the
bids. Anything which it may have done thereafter by
purported recommendation, etc., was without statutory
authority and has no bearing on the subsequent actions
of the other boards of state government.
Subsection (7) of 63-10-7 UCA 1953, as amended,
then is controlling of our consideration.
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It expressly authorizes the building board to " . . .
make contracts for any work which the board is authorized by law to do or cause to be done; ... "
Appellant submits that this includes that work
authorized by 53-38-5 UCA 1953, as amended.
However, that subsection goes on to recite a pertinent restriction on that authority when it continues
" ... and, provided that any contract except those for
professional services to be let to the lowest bidder who
in the judgment of the board i~ responsible and qualified
to do the work. ... "
The lower Court found (Finding of Fact No. 15)
from testimony of plaintiff's own witnesses that defendants (including the State building board), had determined prior to inviting bids that both plaintiff and
intervenor were responsible and qualified to furnish
'
and install the prescribed seating. 63-10-7 (7) UCA
1953, as amended, makes that judgment of the building
board "conclusive".
The building board having exercised its judgment
that intervenor was "responsible and qualified" had
only one other criterion upon which to determine the
bidder to whom the contract must be let. That criterion
lies in the word "lowest" contained in 63-10-7 (7) UCA
1953, as amended.
Intervenor being the lowest bidder of those predetermined to be "responsible and qualified" should
have been let the contract. To do otherwise is outside
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any authority granted the building board by any of the
pertinent statutes. For the lower Court to permit the
building board the authority to dicker with the highest
bidder on terms which were not available to other
bidders or prospective bidders and then let the contract
to said highest bidder constitutes a complete emasculation of the competitive bidding aspects of our statutes.
What the lower Court's decision effectively does
is to rewrite that subsection to permit the building board
to prepare detailed plans and specifications, invite
written and sealed bids thereupon and then dicker and
finagle with the bidders and, eventually, award the
contract to whomsoever it sees fit, notwithstanding
competitive price and notwithstanding the successful
bidder's failing to meet the requirements of the detailed
plans and specifications.
Intervenor submits that, whatever the reason for
the lower Court's action, it canont be permitted to judicially amend the legislative enactments so as to remove
competitive bidding from building board projects.
Intervenor feels impelled to point out that plaintiff did not bid its "air-conditioned Cadillac" against
intervenor's "air-conditioned Continental." It bids its
"air-conditioned Cadillac" ("Seat Type 3") against
intervenor's "air-conditioned Continental" and then
told the Board of Regents and building board "'V e'll
cut our bid if you'll eliminate the air-conditioning (selfriser) and leave off the wheels (plastic armrests)."
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Even then, intervenor's air-conditioned Continental was
the low bid!

POINT 2: THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A LEGALLY
PROTECTABLE INTEREST AND STANDING IN COURT TO PREVENT EXECUTION
OF A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE
BUILDING BOARD AND INTERVENOR.
Plaintiff filed it~ suit when the building board was
about to execute a contract with intervenor and successfully delayed execution of such a contract. Plaintiff
was an unsuccessful bidder; further, plaintiff was the
high bidder.
This Court previously has announced that someone seeking judicial recourse must have a legally-protectable interest (Lyon Y. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228
P .2d 818) . That plaintiff did not have such a legallyprotectable interest is well established by the general
law, the U. S. Supreme Court and, of extreme importance, by this Court.
Interestingly enough, the prior cases involve attempts by the lowest bidder to compel letting of a contract to it rather than to a higher bidder. The Courts
have universally said that the lowest bidder has no interest which the Courts will protect; how, then, can the
lower Court now say that the highest bidder has such
an interest?
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Speaking of a writ of mandamus, 34 AmJ ur 936
(Mandamus, Section 160) says in part: " . . . The
writ will not ordinarily issue to compel a municipal
corporation or other public body, or their officers, to
enter into a contract with the lowest bidder, ... " This
same principle of law is emphasized in 43 AmJ ur 806
(Public Works and Contracts, Section 64.)
The reason for this general rule is, of course, basic
to our form of government: the judiciary will not interfere with the administrative actions of the executive
without a showing of other factors which make those
actions grounds for judicial relief.
This principle has been adopted by this Court in
Schulte vs. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 292, 10 P.2d 625
(1932), and reiterated in Clayton v. Salt Lake City,
15 Utah 2d 57, 387 P.2d 93 (1963).
In the Schulte case, this Court said: "Courts will
not interfere with the decision of the city authorities
in awarding a contract if such decision is founded upon
such facts that it is not a manifest abuse of discretion,
is exercised in good faith, is in the interest of the public
and is without collusion or fraud, and is not influenced
by motives of personal favoritism or ill will." In the
Clayton case, this Court rephrased the principle when
it said: "The Court is reluctant to interfere with the
administrative function and would do so only if facts
were shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud, collusion or
lack of good faith in performing the duty mentioned."
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Two factors present in the Schulte and Clayton
cases which are not present in the instant case should
be emphasized. Both the Schulte and Clayton cases
involved the LOWEST bidder seeking judicial assistance in preventing the contracts from being awarded
to a higher bidder; and, both of the cited cases involved
statutes which did not require competitive nor even
refer to letting the contract to the lowest bidder. In the
Schulte case, this was Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, Sec.
819, as amended by Laws of Utah 1919, Ch. 14. In the
Clayton case, the statute was 10-7-20 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which still is the law in this State.
In both of those instances, this Court said the lowest
bidder could not judicially challenge the letting or
proposed letting of a public contract to a higher bidder. Is it not, then, a fortiori, that the highest bidder
cannot judicially challenge the letting or proposed
letting of a public contract to the lowest bidder?
Intervenor submits that if the law is otherwise
then the law is in a desperate position in this area.
Intervenor was about to receive the contract in
question. Without plaintiff's seeking judicial assistance,
intervenor would have received that contract. The
crux of plaintiff's lawsuit was the fact that it did not
choose to agree with legal advice given to the building
board by its constitutional legal adviser, the Attorney
General of the State of Utah.
The building board did not have to follow that
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legal advice but elected to do so and to award the contract to the lowest bidder. Intervenor submits to this
1-Ionorable Court that the effect of plaintiff's lawsuit
was to challenge the decision of the building board to
follow its own attorney's advice and further submits
that such a challenge is not justiciable in the Courts,
provides plaintiff with no legally-protectable interest
and provides plaintiff with no standing in Court.
Had the building board elected not to follow the
advice of the Attorney General and had executed a
contract with plaintiff, under the Schulte and Clayton
cases, intervenor would have had no such legally-protectable interest or standing in Court. However, just
because it elected to follow that legal advice of the constitutionally-designated officer, plaintiff has no standing in Court than intervenor would have had if the
action of the building board had been reverse.
Intervenor submits that the decision of the lower
Court should be reversed and plaintiff's action dismissed
with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,

OLLIE McCULLOCH
Attorney for Appellant

510 American Oil Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
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